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Hindu nationalism presents Indian women with a variety of challenges and opportunities. 
This essay begins by looking at the historical origins of Hindu nationalism in the colonial 
period, particularly with respect to the role of women in this period of nationalism. It also 
considers the role of masculinity in Hindutva politics, and the idea of the ‘defilement’ of 
Mother India by Muslim invaders, as well as the perceived virility of Muslim and Hindu men 
contested in the female body, through sexual violence. It also looks at women’s 
empowerment in the context of right-wing nationalism and militancy and the public role of 
women in the Sangh Parivar. The essay then focuses on the view of the Shiv Sena on 
women, especially in the Bombay riots of 1993. The essay concludes that Hindutva politics 
attempt to marry two visions of the woman: one as a nurturing mother, the other as a 
warrior goddess. Women’s empowerment in this framework is limited to roles that 
conservative leaders link to ‘tradition’ and purity. 
 
 
Jayawardena and de Alwis make the point that the ideological base of identity politics 
and exclusivism is not new; it goes back a century or so to a period of nationalist upsurge 
against both British rule and the foreign religion (Christianity). During colonial rule, 
religious revivalism became a powerful opposition movement. This revivalism involved 
an assertion of a national identity and a cultural/linguistic consciousness in opposition to 
the identity/culture imposed on the colonised by their European rulers. This revivalism of 
the majority communities had adverse effects on minorities and women. For example, as 
many feminists have pointed out, women were constructed as ‘Mothers of the Nation’ to 
carry out the revivalist project and their biological role as reproducers of the nation was 
highlighted, instrumentalising women's ‘reproductive functions and their bodies in the 
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interests of the State’ (de Alwis and Jayawardena 1996: 162). The nationalist project drew 
women out of the home into the anti-imperialist struggle (addressing public meetings, 
running schools for girls, fighting for the right to vote, et cetera), while simultaneously 
imposing a new agenda for women as carriers of tradition. 
Manisha Sethi argues that in the 20th century women were seen as ‘breeders’ and 
their bodies seen as vessels of future Hindu warriors (2002). The thematic of Hindu 
impotence was beginning to be employed not as defeatist resignation but as a clarion 
call for action. The charge of Hindu effeminacy was countered by rhetoric of decline and 
degeneration from an Aryan past inhabited by fierce and vigorous men and spiritual and 
learned women. People such as the Marathas, Sikhs and Rajputs, with their recent history 
of combat with the Muslim rulers, were extolled for their valour and worked into a single 
collective Hindu identity. The virility of the Hindu male was recuperated for the present 
by conjoining textual Brahmanism with ‘true kshatriyahood’. If centuries of ‘Muslim 
oppression’ and British rule had emasculated Hindus, their virility would be retrieved 
now by fighting and defeating the British but most importantly the Muslim (Sethi 2002: 
1547). Women were not to appear merely as ‘tropes’, symbols of collective honour and 
shame, eternal victims – weak and suffering. They were to be empowered for self-defence 
(atmaraksha) by manifesting valour (virya). A new image of woman embellished by arms 
and preying on the ‘predatory Muslims’ began to be cultivated (Ibid.). 
A significant feature of Hindu nationalism and inter-religious violence in India is 
‘communalism’. Communalism in the Indian context refers to an exclusive attachment to 
one’s own community and active hostility towards other communities that co-exist in the 
same geographical region. Hindu communalism in India is primarily organised through 
Hindu nationalism (Hindutva), embodied within various political and cultural 
organisations (Anand 2007: 257). 
Particular stereotypical representations of Muslims in Hindu nationalist rhetoric help 
foster an identity based on the intersecting ideas of masculinity, nationalism, violence, 
and sexuality (Ibid: 258). Hindutva narratives often start out with pious views of ‘tolerant 
Hindus’, peaceful and peace-loving, killed and persecuted by Muslims throughout 
history. There is also a notable discourse of defilement, linked to the defilement of the 
mother (in the sense of ‘Mother India’), which suggests that Muslims have ‘raped’ or are 
intent on ‘raping’ India (Ibid: 259). 
Dibyesh Anand argues that an ‘anxious masculinity’ lies at the heart of most right-
wing nationalism, including Hindu nationalism in India. He also says that the ingredient 
of anxious nationality acquires lethality when combined with the complicity of the state. 
He says that the state is an ‘embodied institution reproduced through discourses of 
masculinity and nationalism and through practices of violence and control’ (Ibid: 257). 
The perceived fertility and virility of Hindus and Muslims also plays out in right-wing 
nationalism in India. Islam is seen as backward in its attitudes towards reproduction: the 
Koran exhorts adherents to produce more children, there is a prohibition on contra-   
2016   |   The South Asianist 4 (2): 165-171   |   pg. 168 
ceptives, and Muslim men are allowed to have four wives. Muslim reproduction is also 
seen as a calculated move to exert demographic dominance over Hindus. The Hindutva 
narrative also sees irresponsible sexuality as contributing to the ‘overpopulating Muslim 
body’. In this narrative, the virility of the Muslim male is assumed, as is the fertility of the 
passive Muslim female (Anand 2007: 257). Anand also cites Tanya Sarkar in saying that 
there is a perpetual fear of a more virile male Muslim body ‘luring’ away Hindu girls. The 
docile and virtuous Hindu male (exemplified by the Buddh a and by Gandhi) is 
contrasted with a ‘dangerously virile’ Muslim masculinity. Hindutva thus calls for the 
Hindu body to be ‘re-masculinised’, jointly and severally (Ibid: 261). 
Conservative politics naturalise and sanctify the family and sexuality and seclude 
women from the public sphere. They use women's bodies as a battlefield in the struggle 
to appropriate institutional power (de Alwis and Jayawardena 1996: 162). The Gujarat 
riots of 2002 were marked by the killing of and sexual violence against Muslim women 
for ‘public consumption’. The ‘audience’ was comprised of the ‘awakened’ Hindu 
community and the ‘victimised’ Muslim community. Sexual assaults against Muslim 
women serve two purposes: first, brutalising Muslim women, and, second, denigrating 
Muslim men for ‘failing to protect their women’ (Anand 2007: 264). 
As early liberal nationalists understood the importance of drawing women into the 
anti-imperialist struggle and the modernising process, so post-colonial nationalists are 
trying to incorporate women into their movements, based on a mythic religious and 
ethnic identity. There is a phenomenon of right wing ‘fanaticism’ highlighting women 
‘leaders’ and giving them roles to propagate certain religious and social messages (de 
Alwis and Jayawardena 1996: 162). Nationalist movements have used women as cultural 
representatives. Women are the carriers of ‘authenticity’, putting them in a difficult 
position vis-à-vis their gender and religious identities (Ibid: 163). 
Paola Bacchetta, who has spent several years studying the rhetoric and practices of 
the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), discusses in depth the ‘notion of women's 
“empowerment” when articulated in the cadences of racism and violence, and its wider 
implications of making female subordination tolerable and more durable’ (Ibid: 165). 
Policing of borders by the Sangh extends to the geographical and feminised borders of 
Bharat Mata (Mother India), with militant calls for its c leansing through the demolition 
of mosques, which represent Muslim male sexual and communal aggression (Ibid.). 
Manisha Sethi confronts the issue of women’s militancy in the Hindu Right. She 
contends that gender identity does not exist as primordially ordained but is invented, 
created, resisted and subverted at the junction of multiple identities. The entire practice, 
both discursive and material  ̶  the imagery of Bharat Mata, the valiant historical figures 
and subservient mythical wives  ̶  all allow women to become avenging angels in 
moments of crisis. When these moments ebb away, they return to the mode of nurturing 
mothers and obedient wives (Sethi 2002: 1545). 
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No society constructs a single, monolithic gender system. Gender discourses are 
internally differentiated such that different gender positions are available to individuals 
in the multiple discourses and practices that they inform. All the major axes of difference 
(race, class, ethnicity, religion, caste, et cetera) intersect with gender in ways that suggest 
a multiplicity of subject positions within any discourse. So ‘while we can speak of a 
variety of ways of being a man and equally rich ways of being a woman, we can also 
speak of gender enmeshed in other differences such that one form of difference can be 
invoked for another’ (Ibid.). For instance, nation and community may be symbolised in 
the sexual honour of the figure of the mother. The sexualisation of race and caste, 
amongst others, more than anything emphasises that identities, more often than not, are 
about questions of power, and gender exists as a signifier in these power relations (Ibid.). 
Like most other concepts, agency is also a gendered concept. Discourses about sexuality 
and gender frequently construct men and women - the gendered persons - as inhabiting 
different domains of ‘agential capacities’ (Ibid.). There can be explicit associations 
between men, virility, activity and aggressiveness on the one hand and identification of 
women with utter passivity, servility and receptivity on the other. Sherry Ortner attributes 
women's supposed lack of agency to the prevalence of the notion widespread across the 
cultures that women are closer to nature while men reside in the realm of culture (in Sethi 
2002: 1546). So women are associated with the ‘domestic’ or ‘private’ rather than the 
‘public’ domain of social, political and economic life, which only men animate and 
transform. 
To consider the public role of women in the Hindu Right, we may look at the Mumbai 
riots of 1993, which followed the demolition of the Babri Masjid. Madhu Kishwar 
suggests that one of the most disturbing features of this riot was the large-scale, 
enthusiastic participation of women and young girls in the acts of violence (1995). She 
argues that the fascination of women for Sangh Parivar politics is especially noteworthy 
considering that their politics is ‘brazenly macho’. So far, women in India have mostly 
entered politics as the wives, mothers and daughters of powerful male politicians. During 
the riots, many Hindu women in Bombay were openly justifying the rape of Muslim 
women. They argued, ‘Why not? What is wrong with it? For hundreds and thousands of 
years, Muslims have done the same to Hindus. We are settling those old scores because 
now we are powerful and united. They have invited it on themselves’ (Kishwar 1995). 
Sikata Banerjee points out that violent feminine action, although not unheard of, is 
not very common in India. Indian feminists have sought to highlight female strength and 
assertiveness by embracing the goddess Kali as a model of womanhood rather than the 
passive and obedient Sita, wife of Lord Ram (Banerjee 1996: 1214). In the past, reports 
of female involvement in violent situations in India have tended to emphasize the peace-
making role of women, linking the nurturing aspect of the wife and mother role with the 
‘natural’ feminine predilection for peace.
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Concentrating on Hindu, Maharashtrian, lower class, and lower caste women, the 
Shiv Sena (the right wing party in Mumbai that led the 1993 riots) is able to focus on a 
community with shared norms and values and can maximise the appeal of its vision of 
woman and minimise the possibility of dissent. In contrast, feminists have found that their 
respect for diversity and the presence of diverse vo ices make consent on an efficient 
strategy difficult to obtain (Banerjee 1996: 1221). The Shiv Sena leaders live and work in 
the slums of the city, interacting daily with the women of their area. In contrast, feminist 
leaders in Mumbai are mostly middle class, do not live in the slums, and have not 
cultivated the same relations of trust with these women. Thus, the Shiv Sena succeeds by 
fostering an identity that brings Hindu women together. There are no women in the upper 
echelons of the Shiv Sena, and women city council members from the party are elected 
from female-designated municipal wards and firmly follow the lead of male advisors. It 
is true that the male and female leaders share offices and seem to be equal, but the male 
leaders are in a dominant position. Therefore, the entry of women into the public arena 
under the banner of Hindu nationalism has not resulted in an actual female voice in 
political decision-making. It can be argued from a feminist perspective that the Sena's 
strategy is dangerous because it creates an ‘illusion of emancipatory change while 
keeping patriarchal institutions in place’ (Banerjee 1996: 1222). 
Madhu Kishwar also claims that many Hindu women who were mobilized by the 
Shiv Sena joined out of fear rather than conviction (1995). Some women were told that 
if they did not join the riots the police would begin to arrest Hindu men, and their families 
would be at risk. She says that a few courageous women, some from women’s 
organisations and some grassroots level political workers of other political parties, dared 
to go against the tide and intervened openly and sometimes even effectively in saving 
precious lives. These efforts were sporadic and/or isolated, but did sometimes succeed. 
However, on the whole, women’s enthusiastic endorsement of and participation in the 
riots shattered the popular stereotype of women being innately more peace-loving and 
compassionate (Kishwar 1995). 
Kishwar, like Dibyesh Anand, also suggests that in ‘communal’ or Hindu-Muslim 
riots, attempts are made to inflict humiliation and to destroy the sense of self-worth both 
of the women and of the entire community, to make the men feel helpless and unable to 
defend women from being publicly raped and mauled. Seema Hakim’ s experience of 
the Bombay riots of 1993, recounted in Kishwar’s article, is typical of the experience of 
women who fall into the hands of right-wing mobs. Seema saw her husband beaten to 
death in front of her eyes, and her house was looted and destroyed. She herself was gang-
raped after being stripped and paraded in front of her entire neighbourhood (Kishwar 
1995). 
     Hindutva politics attempt to marry two visions of the woman: one as a nurturing 
mother, the other as a warrior goddess. Women’s empowerment in this framework is 
limited to roles that conservative leaders link to ‘tradition’ and purity. The image of the 
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woman as mother sanctifies her, secluding her from the public sphere, excluding her 
from political leadership. The Hindu Right provides opportunities for women (and then 
only Hindu women) only in the sphere of the home, or, rarely, in the streets as an 
‘avenging angel’. The challenges it creates for women are numerous. Some women are 
coerced into joining its activities out of fear of harm to their male family members, or due 
to a lack of any other form of liberation from the domestic sphere. The Hindu Right also 
creates numerous challenges for non-Hindu minority women. As seen in the Mumbai 
riots, the bodies of women become a battleground for a patriarchal war, and violating 
the body of a woman of the ‘other’ community becomes a way to humiliate and denigrate 
the ‘other’ male. Justification for these activities is drawn from discourses on male 
sexuality and virility, and the female voices of both majority and minority communities 
remain unheard.  
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